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The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood
JACOB GERNER HARIRI University of Copenhagen
This article documents that precolonial state development was an impediment to the developmentof democracy outside Europe, because indigenous state institutions constrained the Europeancolonial endeavor and limited the diffusion of European institutions and ideas. Some countries
were strong enough to resist colonization; others had enough state infrastructure that the colonizers would
rule through existing institutions. Neither group therefore experienced institutional transplantation or
European settlement. Less developed states, in contrast, were easier to colonize and were often colonized
with institutional transplantation and an influx of settlers carrying ideals of parliamentarism. Using OLS
and IV estimation, I present statistical evidence of an autocratic legacy of early statehood and document
the proposed causal channel for a large sample of non-European countries. The conclusion is robust to
different samples, different democracy indices, an array of exogenous controls, and several alternative
theories of the causes and correlates of democracy.
There is scholarly agreement that statehood is anecessary condition for democracy: Before wecan have democracy, we have to have a state.1
Yet what happens once we have a state—is the pro-
cess of state building somehow conducive to the de-
velopment of democracy? If one uses the history of
early modern Europe as a reference, many scholars
would answer in the positive (e.g., Bates 1991, 25; Finer
1997, 19; North 1990, 49; Tilly 1975): In the process
of state building, asset-owning citizens were convened
such that rulers could bargain with them for revenues,
and the origins of representative assemblies in early
modern Europe can thus be seen as an unintended
consequence of that process (Tilly 1975, 633).
This article documents that—outside the European
continent—the historical consequence of an early
development of statehood has been autocracy, not
democracy. This occurred because indigenous state in-
stitutions constrained the European colonial endeavor
and limited the diffusion of institutions and ideas from
Europe. Some countries were strong enough to re-
sist colonization; others had enough state infrastruc-
ture that the colonial powers would rule to a con-
siderable degree through existing institutions. Neither
group therefore experienced institutional transplanta-
tion nor European settlement. As a result, in societies
with more precolonial state development it was more
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1 This view is naturally associated with Huntington (1968, e.g. p. 8):
“Authority has to exist before it can be limited.” More recent for-
mulations hold that the broader concept of “stateness” is necessary
for democracy. Stateness adds to the concept of the “state” either a
dimension of nationality (e.g., Linz and Stepan 1996) or a capacity
dimension—the ability to implement state policies (e.g., Bunce 2000).
likely that the traditional mode of rule—autocracy—
was preserved. In countries with less precolonial state
development, the indigenous state was not an obstacle
to European settlement and institutional transplanta-
tion. These countries were more likely therefore to
embark on a democratic regime trajectory.
Consistent with the overall argument, I present sta-
tistical evidence of an autocratic legacy of early state-
hood for 111 countries outside Europe and document
its mechanism: (1) Early statehood was an impediment
to colonization, and if colonized, earlier states were
more likely to be colonized without European settle-
ment and with an indirect form of colonial rule; and
(2) countries that did not experience massive Euro-
pean settlement or were colonized with indirect rule
are significantly less democratic today. I document the
findings using bothOLSand instrumental variable (IV)
estimation.Under the exclusion restriction, I argue that
not only is early statehood negatively associated with
current levels of democracy, it seems to have caused
a substantial and significant democratic deficit outside
Europe.
Many factors have been claimed to mediate the
effect of state-building processes on national regime
trajectories. In the literature that sees regime devel-
opments as the outcome of a fiscal bargaining game
between revenue-seeking rulers and asset-owning cit-
izens, it is commonly argued that if citizens are strong
relative to the ruler, it is more likely that the ruler
will have to concede control over (fiscal) legislation
to a representative assembly. To take but a few ex-
amples, Bates and Lien (1985) argue that the strength
of the citizens (and the prospects for democracy) is
an increasing function of the elasticity of the tax base.
Ertman (1997) claims that territorially based repre-
sentative assemblies were stronger vis-a`-vis the ruler
than status-based assemblies and that, consequently,
parliamentarism was more likely to arise in the former.
Hoffman and Rosenthal (2000) argue that, when the
penalty for rulerswho losewars is relatively high, rulers
are more likely to surrender power to a representative
assembly.Using a somewhat different logic, Tilly (1985)
andDowning (1992) argued earlier that if state revenue
is easily appropriable, domestic resource mobilization
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need not require a large bureaucratic state apparatus
nor lead to absolutism.
To the set of domestic factors that have been pro-
posed to mediate the effect of statehood on subse-
quent regime developments, this article adds an ex-
ternal one—the diffusion of European influence during
the colonial period. Outside Europe, early state devel-
opment affected national regime trajectories not only
via a domestic bargaining game but also through its
effect on whether and how countries were colonized.
Although it focuses on an external factor, this analysis
is not wholly silent on the domestic dynamics of the
state-regime nexus. First, it suggests that a long history
of statehood might have shifted the bargaining power
toward the ruler in control of the state apparatus: Just
as indigenous state development allowed rulers to fend
off Europeans, it must have also facilitated the repres-
sion of internal opposition.2 Second, it shows that even
if state building can create a long-run impetus to parlia-
mentarism by unleashing a fiscal bargaining game, this
effect cannot be very strong outside Europe.3 Specifi-
cally, it is dominated by the negative effect of having
kept Europeans away or having been colonized with
indirect rule. Third, this analysis shows that even if
statehood is a necessary condition for democracy, out-
side the European continent, early statehood has not
been conducive to democracy.
The purpose of this study is not to explain regime
variation outside Europe. It has a more modest aim:
to identify the importance of a factor that has been
overlooked in the literature and is of central impor-
tance to political science: state development up to 1500.
The negative association between early state develop-
ment and contemporary democracy outsideEurope is a
stylized fact that, to my knowledge, is new to the social
sciences.4 The finding is tangent to the important result
that European colonialism caused a reversal in levels
of development among former colonies (Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson 2001; 2002; Engerman and
Sokoloff 2002): Prosperous territories generally expe-
rienced an extractive formof colonization,whereas less
prosperous territories were colonizedwithmassiveEu-
ropean settlement. The institutional legacies of these
distinct forms of colonization caused a reversal of eco-
nomic fortune among the former European colonies
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002, 1244ff.). Al-
though the argumentmade here is clearly related, there
are important differences. Our sample is not limited to
former colonies, so the argument speaks not only to
the institutional legacies of European colonization but
also to the persistence of authoritarianism in the old
2 Slater (2003), Bellin (2004), and Levitsky and Way (2010) also
highlight the centrality of states’ coercive and extractive capacities
in explaining authoritarian durability.
3 Herbst (2000, 20) and Centeno (2002, 20f.) have argued that the
cycle of war making and state making often did not necessitate re-
source extraction and bargaining between ruler and subjects outside
Europe. In Africa, wars were not territorial (Herbst); in Latin Amer-
ica, they were limited in scope (Centeno).
4 In a sample of former colonies, Ola Olsson (2009, 542) used state
development (not precolonial) as a control variable in a regression of
democracy on colonial duration and reported a negative association.
states where the traditional authority structures were
not upset by colonization. Moreover, I emphasize the
importance of a distinctly political factor, state devel-
opment, in shaping the pattern of European coloniza-
tion and settlement. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002)
focus on factor endowments, and Acemoglu, Johnson,
andRobinson (2001) focus on thedisease environment.
Examining the effect of early statehood on subse-
quent regime developments is complicated by the en-
dogeneity of statehood. The way a state is governed
affects the probability that it will survive as a state.
In addition, unobserved cultural and historical factors
as well as the influence of important individuals might
plausibly affect both a country’s state history and its
regime trajectory. To alleviate endogeneity concerns I
use instrumental variable (IV) estimation. The timing
of the Neolithic Revolution (the historical transition
from foraging to farming) is used as a source of ex-
ogenous variation in precolonial state development.
This identification strategy is based on the simple idea
that an early transition from hunting-gathering to set-
tled agriculture predicts an early development of state
institutions. I find very similar results using both OLS
and IV estimation, which strengthens the conclusions.
I examine the validity of the instrumental variable
by controlling for a host of factors that might affect
the exclusion restriction and also do three-stage least
squares (instrumenting the onset of the Neolithic Rev-
olution with indicators of climate volatility, inspired by
Ashraf andMichalopoulos [2010]). None of these tests
changes the conclusions. I also control for income per
capita, education, fractionalization, natural resources,
and other factors to document that the negative effect
of early statehood on democracy cannot be attributed
to alternative theories on the causes of democracy.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows.
After outlining the argument from historical obser-
vation, I present OLS and IV results that document
the autocratic legacy of early statehood. The following
section presents the two steps of the overall argument
separately. I then corroborate the results by showing
that the reduced-form effect of early statehood on
democracy is very close to the estimate implied by the
proposed causal channel and that the negative asso-
ciation between statehood and democracy disappears
once I condition on the causal channel. In the penul-
timate section I show that our findings are robust to
alternative theories of democracy, and the last section
concludes.
THE ARGUMENT
The argument comes in two parts. First, I argue that the
pattern of statehood outside Europe affected the pat-
tern of European colonization and settlement. I then
argue that European settlement affected the spread
of early representative institutions and that traditional
forms of authority were more likely to persist in coun-
tries where Europeans did not settle in large numbers.
The argument is historical institutionalist in nature
(e.g., Pierson 2000; Thelen and Steinmo 1992) with
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its focus on authoritarian persistence and institutional
path dependence more generally, interrupted at the
critical juncture of European colonization and settle-
ment.
Indigenous State Development,
Colonization, and Settlement
Outside Europe, the world of the late 15th century was
not a tabula rasa. Europeans could not go where they
wanted, colonize whom they wanted, or settle where
they wanted. They were constrained by the pattern
of indigenous state organization outside the continent
(e.g., Ferro 1997, 195).
Territories governed by state-like institutions were
harder to colonize because centralized authority under
a single ruler enabled polities to respond decisively
and mount coordinated resistance (cf. Crone 1986, 71).
Also, because defense is a public good, autonomous
polities or tribes had an incentive to free-ride on the
defensive efforts of others. Free-riding is harder when
authority is centralized in a single polity. Moreover,
one-body polities are likely to be less fraught with dis-
unity and internal strife (Spruyt 1994, 166) for colonists
to exploit in divide-and-conquer strategies.
In North Africa and the Middle East, the Euro-
peans encountered comparatively organized state insti-
tutions,which theywereunable to colonize (Abernethy
2000, 258; Finer 1997, 1203).Not that theydidnot try: In
the early 16th century, Charles V of Spain repeatedly
fought the Ottomans over territory in North Africa,
but he never succeeded in dislodging the Ottoman
stronghold. In 1578, the last Portuguese settlement in
Morocco was abandoned after the disastrous defeat at
Ksar El Kebir, which cost the lives of King Sebastian
and 8,000 soliders.
Things were easier in the New World. In the Aztec
and Inca empires, Europeans also encountered state-
like organizations, but they were relatively young and
did not present a unified front against the colonists. On
the contrary, conflict between the people of Tlaxcala
and the rulers in Tenochtitla´n was an important fac-
tor in Hernan Corte´s’ conquest of the Aztec capital.5
The Spanish conquests in Peru similarly enjoyed the
active support of many tribes subject to Inca rule
(Scammell 1989, 65). In Brazil, the Portuguese found
tribal societies that were seen at the time as particu-
larly bellicose and fought the colonizers ferociously,6
but their resistance lacked the coordination of a cen-
tralized state. The tribes were autonomous polities that
fought as much among themselves as they fought the
Europeans (Metcalf 2005, 202f). Internal strife and an
inability to coordinate resistance also facilitated Eu-
ropean penetration in North America, where “settlers
5 When Corte´s conquered Tenochtitla´n, the Spanish forces of fewer
than 350 men were joined by some 6,000 Tlaxcalan warriors
(Abernethy 2000, 266).
6 As described by one contemporary European, the Indian warriors
in Brazil were “so relentless in their wars that as long as they can
move arms and legs, they fight on unceasingly, neither retreating nor
turning their backs” (Jean de Le´ry, quoted in Metcalf [2005, 200]).
paired with the Narrangansetts against the Pequots,
then with the Mohegans against the Narrangansetts”
(Abernethy 2000, 266).
In sub-Saharan Africa, it is suggestive of the impor-
tance of state development that Ethiopia, the oldest
kingdom-state on the continent, was the only country
strong enough to avoid colonization. In the account of
historian Sven Rubenson, it was precisely because of
its long history of statehood that Ethiopia could re-
tain independence: “[Ethiopia] was [a] one body polity
aware of one common identity and there was a greater
political cohesion and awareness of the issues involved
than the enemies of Ethiopia foresaw.” (quoted inRam
1977, 54). InAsia, similar stories happened inmainland
China and Japan. The Tokugawa shogunate in Japan
was strong enough to evict European merchants, mis-
sionaries, and settlers; prohibit Christianity; and per-
secute indigenous converts. For two centuries, Japan
was almost hermetically sealed off from European in-
fluence under the Sakoku policy (Storry 1960, 54ff.). In
China, the authorities greatly restricted the presence of
European merchants, and trade was allowed only with
a government-authorized merchant guild.
In short, the colonial ambitions of the Europeans
were restricted by the military, political, and admin-
istrative capabilities—the state-likeness—of the non-
European territories. Yet precolonial state develop-
ment not only affectedwhich territorieswere colonized
but also shaped the colonization strategy. Where state-
like institutions and authority structures were already
in place, metropolitan rule could superimpose itself
on the existing framework and govern through the es-
tablished channels in a system of indirect rule.7 Thus,
Gerring et al. (2011, 382) argue that the colonial power
needed to identify an agent to whom authority could
be delegated, and “[t]he capacity of [state]B to serve as
an agent of [state] A is a function of how state-like the
polity, B, is.” It was simply easier for a colonial power
to use existing authority and state infrastructure than
to destroy and rebuild from scratch (385). In summary,
territories with more developed precolonial state in-
stitutions were less likely to be colonized, but if they
were, they were more likely to be colonized with an
indirect form of rule.
To be sure, state development was only one among
a large set of factors shaping the pattern of European
colonialism: The colonial endeavor was driven impor-
tantly, but not exlusively, by a mercantilist search for
precious metals and trade monopolies in the 16th cen-
tury and, in the late 19th century, partly by an element
of rivalry among the European great powers.8 In my
7 By indirect rule I mean the incorporation of domestic institutions
into the overall apparatus of colonial rule. Indirect rule features
substantial delegation of authority from the colonial power to in-
digenous authorities. See Lange (2004, 906); Gerring et al. (2011,
377).
8 Other prominent interpretations of colonialism have emphasized
populist nationalism (e.g., Hayes [1941] 1961): strategic considera-
tions to defend existing colonies and important trade routes (e.g.,
Robinson and Gallagher 1961); a social atavism of Europe’s precap-
italist aristocracy that sought “expansion for the sake of expanding”
(Schumpeter [1951] 1961, 47); the erosion of home markets, caused
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argument, European colonization and settlement serve
as the intervening variable that mediates the effect of
early state development on subsequent regime devel-
opments. Of the litany of factors that shaped Euro-
pean colonialism, in the analyses that follow, I control
for those that could potentially exert an independent
influence on countries’ regime trajectories (i.e., those
that are potentially endogenous to the research ques-
tion at hand). These include the precolonial disease
environment, which not only shaped the pattern of Eu-
ropean settlement (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
2001) but might also affect a country’s long-run regime
development (e.g., via economic development), and a
country’s natural resource endowments, distance from
Europe, soil quality, and topographic characteristics
(e.g., Nunn and Puga 2012). In later sections, I docu-
ment a very strong negative effect of precolonial state
development on threemeasures of European coloniza-
tion (colonization, colonial duration, and European
settlement), even conditional on these other factors.
Colonization, Settlement, and
Regime Development
European colonization and settlement did not export
democracy, but European settlers did bring institu-
tional forms of governance from their countries of
origin, as well as their identity as Europeans. Both
factors facilitated the spread of early representative
institutions.
Consider, for example, the Recopilacio´n de las leyes
de Indias, the body of laws issued by the SpanishCrown
for its overseas possessions in the 16th and 17th cen-
turies: “Inasmuch as the Kingdoms of Castile and of
the Indies are under one Crown, the laws and man-
ner of government of one should conform as nearly
as possible to those of the other. Our Royal council
... must ensure that those Kingdoms [the Indies] are
administered according to the same form and order as
Castile and Le´on” (Finer 1997, 1394). By 1776, about
a century later, Adam Smith observed that there was
a close correspondence betweenmetropolitan political
institutions and overseas political institutions not only
in the Spanish Empire but also in all colonial empires
(quoted in Greene 2007, 171).
Institutional transplantation was not an export of
democracy because none of the colonial powers were
democratic at the time. In the Spanish Empire, for ex-
ample, laws and important appointments descended
from the Crown. In the Americas, the town councils
(the cabildos) did involve popular participation, but
meetings were monitored by the king’s representative,
the corregidor: “As a repository of the people’s liberty,
a training school for the democratic system, the cabildo
possessed no potency at all.”9 Even so, it was a system
of comprehensive checks and balances where lower
by rising inequality in newly industrialized Europe (Hobson [1902],
1961); and overseas activity to compensate for military defeat in
Europe (Abernethy 2000, 210; Ferro 1997, 8).
9 HubertHerring,AHistory ofLatinAmerica, quoted in Finer (1997,
1387).
local officials, the Council of the Indies, and the rel-
atively independent audencias all checked the power
of the Spanish viceroys in America. To Samuel Finer
(1997, 1389), the countries of the Spanish American
Empire represented “the supreme examples of the
legalistic character of the nascent modern European
state.” TheNorthAmerican territories were no democ-
racies either. The representative of the English Crown
had extensive prerogatory powers over the colonial
assemblies—more extensive, in fact, than the king’s
power vis-a`-vis the House of Commons in England
(1401).
Yet the authority of the European courts was three
thousand miles away; the settlers were empowered by
the easy availability of land and their status as prop-
ertied men; and they took with them their identities
as English, Spaniards, and Portuguese. Whatever po-
litical right was granted in their motherlands, they felt
the same right should apply overseas as well (Finer
1997, 1385–6, 1403). The settlers were in “communi-
cation and communion” with their countries of origin
and were influenced by events there. Bernard Bailyn
(1967, 43) shows how opposition thought in the North
American settler colonies was inspired primarily by
the political writings of the Whig opposition in Eng-
land in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Euro-
pean ideals transmitted to European settlers under-
lay the American Revolution and the first democracy
in the New World. In fact, everywhere in the New
World—except Haiti—nationalist leaders who rejected
themonarchical principle and the titled aristocracy and
who advocated the creation of republican forms of gov-
ernment were from the European settler community
(Abernethy 2000, 73).10 In short, European settlement
and influence were among the important factors that
helped shape the international distribution of political
regimes.
Thus far I have argued that traditional forms of
authority were less likely to survive in countries that
experienced mass European settlement and, by impli-
cation, were more likely to survive in old states that
were strong enough to resist colonization.11 There is
an intermediate category—countries that were colo-
nized without settlement and with a relatively indi-
rect form of colonial rule. Here, metropolitan powers
ruled through the existing pattern of political authority
and allowed substantial local political discretion. This
meant that colonial rulers would often reinforce tradi-
tional forms of authority (e.g., Linz 2000, 147) and sus-
pend local regime dynamics (e.g., Berman 1984, 187).
10 Clearly, the political history of Latin America came to no end in
the early 19th century: through most of the 20th century, democracy
was notoriously unstable in the region. Yet despite transitions back
and forth between popular rule and caudillismo, since independence,
democracy always existed as a feasible regime alternative in Latin
America (Przeworski 2009, 10).
11 A long history of statehood can serve to legitimize traditional
authority structures. For example, Chebabi and Linz (1998, 15 and
35) mention that the Shah in Iran celebrated twenty-five hundred
years of [autocratic] monarchy in 1971 and that a cult of ancient
Babylonia legitimized Saddam Hussein alongside Baath Arab na-
tionalism. Also, a more developed state enhanced the rulers’ ability
to intimidate and repress internal opposition.
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Indirect colonial rule was not conducive to the sub-
sequent development of democracy because (a) there
was only limited institutional diffusion, (b) there was
limited European settlement and ideational diffusion,
and (c) the incorporation of indigenous political insti-
tutions would often reinforce the existing authoritarian
authority structures.
Later sections present statistical evidence in support
of the claim that European settlement facilitated the
spread of democratic institutions and that territories
that were not colonized or were colonized with indirect
rule are relatively autocratic today.
From Historical Observation to
Large-N Analyses
The preceding sections used historical observation to
build an argument for why precolonial state develop-
ment has left an autocratic legacy outside theEuropean
continent. Before proceeding with the econometric ev-
idence, I state my empirical predictions.
A.1 Countries with more developed precolonial state-
hood were less likely to be colonized and to expe-
rience European settlement.
A.2 Countries that were not colonized and experi-
enced little European settlement are more likely
to have remained autocratic.
B.1 Conditional on being colonized, more developed
precolonial states were likely to be colonized with
an indirect form of colonial rule and without set-
tlement.
B.2 Conditional on being colonized, countries that ex-
perienced indirect colonial rule and little settle-
ment are more likely to have remained autocratic.
Together, these hypotheses explain why an early devel-
opment of statehood outside Europe was an historical
impediment to the development of democracy.
DATA DESCRIPTION
I measured early state development using the State
Antiquity Index (Version 3) developed by Bockstette
and Putterman (2007).12 The index uses the borders of
present-day countries to identify observations, and it is
constructed by scoring each of the 39 half-centuries
from year 1 to 1950 by answering three questions
(scores in parentheses): (a) Is there a government
above the tribal/chiefdom level? (1 if yes, 0.75 if
chiefdom, 0 if tribe); (b) Is the government locally
based? (1 if yes, 0.75 if there is a local government with
substantial foreign oversight, 0.5 if foreign based); (c)
How much of the present-day country’s territory was
ruled by the historical government? (1 if more than
50%; 0.75 if between 25%and 50%, 0.5 if between 10%
and 25%, 0.3 if less than 10%). Scores from the three
12 The index has been used in a number of studies, including Chanda
and Putterman (2005), Gerring et al. (2011), Olsson (2009), Petersen
and Skaaning (2010), and Posner (n.d.).
questions are multiplied for each half-century, and the
index of state history is computed by summing the dis-
counted value of the scores for the 39 half-centuries
(see Bockstette and Putterman 2007).
Overall, this measure of state development captures
reasonably well the ability of non-European territories
to resist colonization and limit European settlement.
First, the definition of statehood as government above
a tribal or chiefdom level implies a concentration of
decision-making authority and resources at the level of
the state instead of in a number of autonomous tribes.
This is consistent with the idea of state development
as an impediment to European colonization, because
states, relative to tribes or chiefdoms, were better able
to raise the resources neccesary to resist colonization
and mount a coordinated defense. Second, in polit-
ical units that historically comprised more than one
contemporaneous country (the Ottoman empire, for
example), the country from where power emanated
(Turkey) scores higher than the “occupied territories”
(Tunisı`a, say). This coding procedure seems meaning-
ful, because it is probably true that, during theOttoman
years, itwouldhavebeeneasier to colonizeTunisı`a than
Turkey. Third, the cumulative nature of the index is
appealing, because there is ample historical evidence
to suggest that cleavages within indigenous political
units facilitated European penetration. If a shared his-
tory within a single polity reduces such cleavages, then
European colonization should depend on the history of
state development up to the time of European arrival
and not just on the level of statehood at that particular
moment.13
The State Antiquity Index is bounded above A.D.,
which in some countries excludes millennia of state
history. This is a source of measurement error in the
independent variable, which biases toward zero esti-
mates of the coefficient on state development in OLS
regressions. In addition to the endogeneity concerns
discussed later, this motivates the use of IV estimation
(the instrumental variable is temporally unbounded
such that IV estimation alleviates this source of mea-
surement error).
From the State Antiquity Index, I constructed the
main independent variable, early state development, as
the index value up to the year 1500. The focus is on
statehood up to 1500, because index values thereafter
reflect European colonization rather than indigenous
state development.14 To gauge the external validity of
the independent variable, I examined the correlation
between early state development (up to 1500) and pop-
ulation density in 1500 for the 107 countries for which
13 The cummulative nature of the index raises the difficult issue
whether past experience with statehood should be discounted and,
if so, at what rate. It has become standard in the literature to use
the index with a 5% discount rate, a convention that is also followed
here. This does not have substantive implications, though. Identical
results are found without discounting, with a 10% discount rate, or
simply using the realized index values in 1500.
14 The results are insensitive to the choice of threshold: Identical
results are obtained when using other plausible thresholds, such as
1750 (the earliest beginnings of the second wave of colonialism) or
a combined threshold of 1500 for the Americas and 1750 for other
countries.
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data are available for both variables. This revealed a
very significant (t = 8.48) positive correlation of 0.57
between the two. This correlation provides some vali-
dation of our measure of early state development, be-
causemore densely populated territories were likely to
have had more developed state institutions.15
The dependent variable is democracy, which is mea-
sured using Polity IV’s composite democracy index
(polity2); the binary ACLP indicator, originally con-
structed by Przeworski et al. (2000) and recently up-
dated by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2009); and
the accumulated democratic experience since 1900
(“Democracy stock”) that Gerring et al. (2005) con-
structed from polity2. The main measure of democracy
is polity2 averaged over the post–Cold War period
(1991 to 2007) to avoid having short spells of regime in-
stability affect the results. Yet identical conclusions are
reached using all three democracy measures, and the
results are very robust to measuring levels of democ-
racy for other years.16
I argue that older states are relatively autocratic be-
cause these states were comparatively good at limiting
European influence and settlement. To test this claim,
I used three proxies for settler penetration and influ-
ence: (1) the fraction of the population speaking as
their first language the language of one of the main
European colonial powers—English, French, German,
Portuguese, or Spanish; (2) the fraction of the popu-
lation of European descent; and (3) the duration of
colonial rule. I preferred measuring settler influence
by language instead of descendancy because the for-
mer is likely to be measured with less error.17 The
crudest measure is colonial duration, because it sub-
stitutes length for penetration and influence. All three
measures, however, yield the same conclusions.
As suggested by Matthew Lange (2004, Appendix
A), a proxy for indirect colonial rule is the number of
colonially recognized customary court cases divided by
the total numberof court cases. This is basedon the idea
that under direct rule, colonial powers would not rec-
ognize customary courts but would instead implement
a uniform legal system based on metropolitan laws.
Under indirect rule, on the contrary, the colonial legal
system would incorporate the indigenous legal struc-
ture. Unfortunately, this measure of indirect rule only
exists for 33 former British colonies. However, because
the formof colonial rule varied very systematicallywith
the number of settlers (Gerring et al. 2011, 388; Lange
2004, 908),18 I used the measures of settlement to pre-
dict the extent of indirect rule for the countries with
15 On the association between statehood and population density see
e.g. Bates (1983, 35 and Table 7) or Herbst (2000, 11f.).
16 Specifically, very similar results are found when averaging polity2
over other periods (1980–2007, 1960–2007, 1900–2007, 1800–1900,
1800–2007, or 1900–1960) or when using values for particular years.
17 In South America the conquistadors immediately intermarried
with local women, beginning a process ofmestizaje (mixing). Sorting
out European descendancy not only is difficult but it also requires
a threshold value above which mestizos are counted as European.
Sucha thresholdwill always be arbitrary. Simply countingwho speaks
what language seems to be a more straightforward measure.
18 For example, Lange (2004, 908) argues that “large-scale settle-
ment colonies [had] very direct forms of rule and nonsettlement
missing values. Although this is obviously a very crude
measure of indirect rule, the qualitative conclusions
reached with this measure (namely that precolonial
state development favored an indirect form of colonial
rule and indirect rulewas not conducive to the develop-
ment of democracy) confirm what other scholars have
found and for non-British colonies as well; see, e.g.,
Gerring et al. (2011, 400–4) and Lange (2005, 135) for
references.
The sample consists of all 111 countries outside Eu-
rope for which State Antiquity Index scores are avail-
able. It is not restricted to former colonies because it is
an integral part of the argument that the countries that
were strong enough to avoid colonization are likely
to have remained autocratic. In the Appendix, Table
A1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables of
interest, and TableA2 lists all the variables and sources
used.
OLS RESULTS
Table 1 reports coefficients from OLS regressions of
democracy on early state development, corresponding
to equation (1):
Di = αD + δSSi + βDXi + Di, (1)
where Di is democracy in country i, Si is early state
development in country i, andXi is a vector of controls.
The coefficient of interest is δS, which measures the
association between state development up to 1500 and
current levels of democracy.
Column (1) documents a highly significant uncondi-
tional correlation between democracy and precolonial
state development outside Europe of –5.47. The esti-
mate implies that if theUnited States (precolonial state
development of zero) had had the same precolonial
state development as China (0.91), we should expect
the U.S. level of democracy to be lower by 0.91 ×
(−5.47) = –4.98 polity2 units, all else equal. The R2
shows that as much as one-tenth of the variation in
contemporary levels of democracy outside Europe is
associated with variation in state development more
than five centuries ago. This attests to the importance
of history in constraining national regime trajectories
(e.g., Downing 1992; Ertman 1997; Tilly 1975).
Column (2) controls for the (absolute) value of lat-
itude. This is informed by Jared Diamond’s argument
that throughout history technologies and institutions
have traveled more easily at similar latitudes where
colonies [had] indirect forms of rule.” There is a sizable and highly
significant negative association between this study’s measures of Eu-
ropean settlement and Lange’s index of the extent of indirect rule
for the countries for which data are available on both variables: The
correlation between the extent of indirect rule and the fraction of
the population speaking a European language as first language is
−0.61 (t= −7.61), and the correlation between the extent of indirect
rule and the fraction of the population of European descent is−0.51
(t = −2.94). I regressed Lange’s proxy for the extent of indirect
rule on European language and European descendancy and used
the coefficients to predict the extent of indirect rule for the countries
where data were missing.
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TABLE 1. OLS Regressions of Democracy on Early State Development
Dependent Variable is Mean polity2 1991–2007 Alt. dependent variable
Base
Sample
Base
Sample
Excl.
Africa &
Mid.
East
Excl. the
Americas
Base
Sample
Base
Sample Only Former Colonies
ACLP
Indicator
Democracy
Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Early state −5.47∗∗∗ −6.24∗∗∗ −7.76∗∗∗ −4.11∗∗ −6.07∗∗∗ −4.44∗∗ −7.28∗∗∗ −8.98∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −235∗∗∗
development (1.71) (1.78) (2.23) (2.07) (2.04) (2.12) (2.06) (2.27) (0.14) (87.3)
Latitude 0.06 −0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.13∗∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.00 1.39
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (2.49)
Africa 0.34 1.10
(2.74) (2.73)
Asia 3.72 4.96∗
(2.66) (2.72)
Latin America 6.13∗∗ 6.77∗∗∗
(2.58) (2.55)
Middle East 0.15 1.07
(2.66) (2.92)
Population density −0.45
in 1500 (log) (0.46)
Settler mortality −1.46∗∗
(log) (0.60)
R2 0.09 0.11 0.23 0.05 0.28 0.29 0.19 0.36 0.06 0.08
Countries 111 111 57 86 111 107 88 72 111 111
Notes: All model specifications include a constant term (not reported to save space). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗
,
∗∗
, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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FIGURE 1. Democracy and Early Statehood outside Europe
CANNZLUSAURYUS
ARG
CHLZAF
LSO
KAZ
SWZ
MOZ
PRY
CUB
KGZ
NAM
MUS
BRA
MDG
HTI
DOM
FJI
JAM
ZWE
ZMB
PHL
SLV
GMB
NIC
MWI
TTO
VEN
CRIPNG
PAN
SLE
MNG
GUY
BFA
BEN
LBR
TGO
COL
CAF
GNQ
BDI
RWA
KEN
GABUGA
BWA
CIV
GIN
ZAR
COG
HND
AGO
NER
TKM
TCD
ECU
AZE
SGP
GHA
MRT
CMR
TJK
LBN
BGD
ISR
GEO
JOR
MLI
SEN
SYR
ARM
GTM
DZA
AFG
UZB
MEX
NGA
IRNDJI
LBYVNM
THA
LAO
IND
TUN
TUR
PER
IDN
YEM
EGY
ERI
PAK
MAR
JPN
SDN
BOL
MYS
CHN
PRK
KOR
NPL
MMR
SOM
KHM
LKA
ETH
−
10
−
5
0
5
10
D
em
oc
ra
cy
−.5 0 .5 1
Early state history
coef = −6.2404423, (robust) se = 1.7751289, t = −3.52
Notes: The regression represented by the fitted line is identical to the model in Table 1, column (2). Countries are identified by three-letter
World Bank country codes.
the length of the day and climate were not drastically
different (Diamond 1997, ch. 10). This specification
compares countries along the historically important
East–West axis rather than the disparate experiences
of the North to the South. The absolute value of the
coefficient increases to−6.24 and the estimate remains
highly significant. Figure 1 shows the graphical repre-
sentation of the model in column (2).
As can be seen from the plot, the result does not
seem to be driven only by a few countries. On the
contrary, excluding high-leverage or high DFBETA-
observations increases both the numerical magnitude
and the significance of the coefficients.19
Column (3) shows the coefficient from a restricted
sample that excludes all countries in the Middle East
and on the African continent. Ancient civilizations ex-
isted in the Middle East and Eastern Africa, and most
countries in the region are autocracies today. Column
(3) shows that these countries are not driving the over-
all pattern of association: The coefficient on early state
19 The following countries exert leverage at or above (2k+ 2)/n:
Cambodia, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Canada, Sri Lanka, Soma-
lia, and Ethiopia. Excluding these seven countries yields a highly
significant coefficient of −7.86 (robust s. e. = 2.11). The following
countries have DFBETAs at or above
∣
∣2/
√
n
∣
∣: Bolivia, Cuba, Japan,
North Korea, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Swaziland. Excluding this
group yields a highly significant coefficient of −8.74 (robust s.e. =
1.67).
development remains negative and significant.20 Col-
umn (4) excludes all countries on the American con-
tinents. State development was relatively recent in the
Americas, and the region is relatively democratic to-
day. It is possible therefore that the relatively young
democratic states in the Americas in fact underlie the
pattern found in the broader sample. Excluding the two
continents lowers the absolute value of the coefficient
from 6.24 to 4.11, but it remains sizable and statistically
significant at a 5% level.21 It should bementioned, also,
that these results are not driven by the four European
offshoots (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States). Excluding this group of countries yields
a highly significant coefficient of −5.09 (robust s.e. =
1.83) (results not reported in Table 1 to save space). In
column (5) regional dummies are included to account
20 An identical conclusion follows when including dummies for
Africa and the Middle East individually or separately or when ex-
cluding each region separately.
21 The conclusion is the same if North and South America are ex-
cluded separately or if instead we use indicator variables. Daniel
Headrick (2010, 131–2) argues that, in the New World, hunter-
gatherers were less vulnerable to the European crowd diseases than
were people in densely populated states. This suggests that the ef-
fects of early statehood might be different in the New World than
elsewhere. However, an interaction between early statehood and the
Americas is consistently far from significancewhether the dependent
variable is democracy or a measure of colonization. Also, its sign is
generally the same as outside the Americas.
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for most of the idiosyncratic regional variation. The
coefficient of interest remains significantly negative.
Themodel in column (6) includes population density
in 1500.Acemoglu, Johnson, andRobinson et al. (2002)
found that territories with relatively high population
densities in 1500 are less economically developed today
because they experienced an extractive form of colo-
nial rule. Although early state development and early
population density are clearly related, the specification
is not gravely plagued by collinearity.22 As shown, the
coefficient on early state development remains sizable
and significant while population density is indistin-
guishable from zero. To further examine the relative
importance of early statehood versus early population
density, I reestimated Table 1 with population density
in 1500 as the independent variable, which revealed
that this variable is less strongly andmuch less robustly
associated with democracy than is early state develop-
ment (results available on request).23
Columns (7) and (8) show the results from a sample
restricted to former European colonies. Overall, these
columns support B.1 and B.2 in showing that, even con-
ditional on being colonized, early state development
is negatively associated with democracy. The columns
also show that old states such as China, Ethiopia, or
Iran that resisted Western European colonization and
are autocracies today do not drive the overall result.
The estimated effect of early statehood on democracy
remains negative and significant even after excluding
this group. Controlling for settler mortality in column
(8) also leaves the conclusion unchanged.
The models in columns (9) and (10) use different
measures of democracy. The model in column (9) re-
peats the basic regression to examine the effect of early
state development on the likelihood of being a democ-
racy in 2007 (as measured by the ACLP indicator). The
coefficient of −0.39 implies that if the United States
had had the same state history as China, the likeli-
hood that it would be a democracy today would be
lower by 0.91 × (−0.39) = −0.35.24 In column (10),
the dependent variable is the accumulated democratic
experience from 1900–2005 as coded by Gerring et al.
(2005). The negative coefficient of 235 implies that had
the United States had China’s state history, we would
expect theU.S. stockof democracy to be lower by 0.91×
(−235)= −214. Roughly speaking, this corresponds to
the elimination of two decades of high-quality democ-
racy (polity2 = 10) in the United States.
The results in Table 1 thus document a very robust
negative association between precolonial state devel-
opment and democracy outside Europe. However, one
should be cautious in interpreting the coefficients as
causal estimates. Past state history is likely to be en-
dogenous to democracy, because the way a state is
22 The variance inflation factor is only 2.8.
23 For example, the association between population density in 1500
and democracy turns insignificant when Africa and the Middle East
are excluded, when the Americas are excluded, or when continent
dummies are included.
24 The model in column (9) is a linear probability model. Identical
results follow from probit or logit models.
governed—its political regime—affects the probability
that it survives as a state. More broadly, it is likely that
unobserved factors affect both a country’s state history
and its regime trajectory. Before addressing this issue,
I pause to make sense of a few of the countries that fit
less well with the overall argument.
A Note on a Few Outliers
Far from the fitted line in Figure 1 are Japan, India,
and Swaziland. In this section, I briefly discuss these
cases that fit less well with the general pattern. Japan
was strong enough to resist colonization, but regime
developments in the country were not historically im-
mune to Western influence. This influence was felt
twice: once by example, during the Meiji Restoration
when Japan took it on itself to emulate Western indus-
trialization (in the process of which Japan also emu-
lated elected parliaments with some executive control;
e.g., Jansen 2000, 377ff.), and once by imposition when
General MacArthur drafted the country’s democratic
post–WorldWar II constitution (Smith 1998, 201). Thus
Japan experiencedWestern influencewithout coloniza-
tion, which is part of the reason why Japan today is
more democratic than we would expect given its level
of precolonial state development.
In India, in contrast, there occurred colonization and
European influence despite an early development of
state structures. Civilization is ancient on the Indian
subcontinent, but it was not until the Mughal Empire
in the 16th century that it came under one crown (Finer
1997, 1210). Even then, a unified, centrally controlled
state apparatus was never imposed (Abernethy 2000,
256; Spear 1965, 70). In contrast to China, then, where
the emperorwas able to limit theEuropean presence to
the port of Canton and allow Europeans to trade only
with one authorized merchant guild, and in contrast to
Japan, where the shogun simply expelled Europeans,
Europeans found room to maneuver in India. Decen-
tralization and local disunity facilitated the penetra-
tion of merchants from Portugal, the Netherlands, and
eventually the British East Indian Company (Scam-
mell 1989, 66), whose practices gradually expanded
to include attributes of statehood (e.g., the right of
taxation in parts of the country). When colonization
ended in 1947 (administration had passed from the
East IndianCompany to theCrown in 1858), theBritish
left an administrative basis and a framework for local
representative government that, it has been argued,
facilitated institutionalization of the democratic norms
under Nehru (Manor 1990; McMillan 2008).25
The opposite applies in Swaziland: Despite exten-
sive European settlement in a young state, the country
25 British colonial rule in India was clearly autocratic, but a set of
reforms were passed to establish legislative councils (1909), increase
indigenous representation in the administration (1919), and extend
suffrage (1935). Despite disappointment with the 1935 reforms, the
Indian National Congress decided to run in the provincial elections
of 1936. This decision and the resultant victory in most of India’s
provinces “played a major role in preparing the ground for liberal
politics after independence and in rendering Congress capable of
integrating state and society” (Manor 1990, 30).
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has remained steadfastly autocratic. Christian Potholm
(1972) attributes this trajectory partly to the country’s
geography: Swaziland was surrounded by white mi-
nority governments in South Africa and Mozambique,
which insulated the country from external influence
during decolonization. Therefore, the traditional tribal
authorities could contest British and local reformers’
attempts to introduce parliamentarism “farmore easily
than if they had been struggling in a more open, less
controlled context.” (6).
ENDOGENEITY CONCERNS AND
CAUSAL IDENTIFICATION
The way a state is governed affects its viability. If cen-
tralized authoritywas historically better at ensuring the
survival of the polity, this could be driving our findings:
It is possible that older states are relatively autocratic
because an early development of effective (autocratic)
decision-making structures allowed them to survive
more consistently as polities, rather than—aspostulated
here—because early state development constrained the
development of democracy.26 If early centralization of
power was an efficient means to secure a relatively un-
interrupted state history, this would bias our estimates
away from zero (such that the estimated negative effect
of early statehood on democracy reported in Table 1
would be exaggerated). The direction of the bias could
also be the opposite, however: Representative political
institutions are often described as a factor conducive to
state survival because they allowed rulers to raisemore
taxes and facilitated the access to credit.27 This would
bias our results toward zero (such that the estimated
negative effect of early statehood on democracy would
be underestimated).Whatever the direction of the bias,
that the characteristics of the political regime affect the
viability of the state is a source of endogeneity.
Political regime development can be a path-
dependent process with deep historical roots. In some
countries, scholars have traced the institutional ori-
gins of modern political regimes back several centuries
(even before 1500).28 If the historical roots of the con-
temporary regime were shaped at the same time or by
the same forces that shaped the development of state
structures, this also constitutes a source of endogeneity
in the analyses presented earlier. Other sources of en-
26 In Hungary and Poland in the 17th and 18th centuries, strong
national assemblies were responsible for “a decline of military effec-
tiveness in both countries, which led to a partial loss of independence
in Hungary and the complete destruction of the state at the hands of
its neighbors in Poland” (Ertman 1997, 31). In Brandenburg-Prussia
in the 17th century, threats to state survival circumscribed the powers
of the representative estates (Downing 1992, 88-95).
27 Conceding control over taxation to a representative assembly was
a credible commitment to fiscal responsibility, which facilitated ac-
cess to taxes and credit (e.g., Levi 1989; North and Weingast 1989;
Stasavage 2003; 2010).
28 See for example Downing (1992, ch. 2) for China, Japan, and
Russia; see Finer (1997, 1190ff. and 1192) for Egypt and theOttoman
vassal states in general; see Levine (1965) for Ethiopia. Huntington
(1968, 152) and Levine (1965, 245) mention that the monarchical
regimes in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iran, and Thailand can be traced
back several centuries.
dogeneity come from influential actors who shape state
history through conquest or a struggle for indepen-
dence while, simultaneously, leaving a lasting impact
on the regime trajectory. Also, one can imagine that
cultural variation in the degree to which hierarchy and
centralized authority are accepted might relate both to
the livelihood of the state and regime development.
To account for these sources of potential endogene-
ity, I used the timing of the Neolithic Revolution as a
source of exogenous variation in early state develop-
ment. The Neolithic Revolution denotes the transition
from foraging to farming some 10,000 years ago when
hunter-gatherers took up plant and animal domesti-
cation and created settlements (Balter 2007).29 The
identification strategy is based on the simple idea that
an early transition to sedentary agriculture predicts an
early development of state institutions: The Neolithic
Revolution paved the way for statehood because set-
tlement led to denser populations through increased
food production and, by permitting a shortened birth
interval (Ashraf and Michalopoulos 2010; Diamond
1997).With food surpluses came a non-food-producing
sector, which together with increased populations led
to specialization, social stratification, and political or-
ganization (Diamond 1997, 92). Figure 2 illustrates the
unconditional relationship between the timing of the
Neolithic Revolution and early state development for
our base sample of non-European countries.30
As argued, there is a clear positive association; ter-
ritories that made an earlier transition to agriculture
also developed statehood earlier. This is described by
equation (2):
Si = αS + δTTi + βSXi + Si, (2)
where Ti is the timing of the Neolithic transition in
country i, Si is the early state development of country i,
andXi is a vector of controls.31 Together, equations (1)
and (2) constitute our two-stage least squares (2SLS)
approach, where Ti is used as a source of exogenous
variation in Si in the first stage (equation (2)). This
approach yields a consistent estimate of the causal ef-
fect of precolonial state development on current levels
of democracy under the exclusion restriction that Ti
is uncorrelated with Di in equation (1) (Wooldridge
2002, 92f.). In words, this means that the timing of the
transition to sedentary agriculture affects contempo-
rary levels of democracy only through its effect on early
statehood (that is, through Si). Certainly, the timing of
theNeolithic Revolution is not the only determinant of
the development of state institutions, but because the
29 There is archaeological evidence of at least 11 independent centers
of origin, spread across the globe (Balter 2007).
30 Data on the timing of the Neolithic Revolution are from Putter-
man and Trainor (2006).
31 It is immediately clear from Figure 2 that adding a quadratic term,
Ti2, improves the model fit. However, because the coefficient on Ti2
is very far from significance in most of the reduced-sample analyses
in Table 2 and because the second-stage coefficients are the same
whether Ti2 is included or not, I chose not to include it as a first-stage
regressor.
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FIGURE 2. Timing of the Neolithic Revolution and Early State Development
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jittered to reduce overlay.
first stage estimates a reduced-form equationwe do not
need a full structuralmodel of thedeterminants of early
state development (e.g., Wooldridge 2002, 84). The
next subsection presents 2SLS results and discusses the
validity of the instrumental variable estimator.
Two-stage Least Squares Results
Panel A of Table 2 shows 2SLS estimates of the ef-
fect of precolonial state development on democracy (δS
in equation (1)). Panel (B) shows corresponding first-
stage results.32 Throughout, there is a very strong first-
stage association between the timing of the Neolithic
Revolution and early state development, and the F-test
is well above the standard threshold of 10 for the 2SLS
estimator to produce unbiased results.
The unconditional effect of precolonial state devel-
opment on current levels of democracy is −7.18 in col-
umn (1), and controlling for latitude in column (2), the
estimate becomes−9.54. Both are very significant. The
coefficient of −9.54 implies that increasing the length
of early state development by 0.91 (corresponding to
the difference between China and the United States)
32 The first stage includes as controls all explanatory variables from
the main estimating equation, (i.e., the controls included in equation
(1)). To save space, only the coefficient on the timing of the Neolithic
Revolution is reported from the first stage.
will cause an average change of 0.91 × (−9.54) = −8.7
polity2-units.
The models in columns (1)–(5) and (7)–(10) do the
same sample manipulations and include the same con-
trol variables as in Table 1, this time using the 2SLS
approach. All of these model specifications confirm
the conclusion that an early development of state insti-
tutions was an impediment to democracy outside the
European continent. Comparing Tables 1 and 2 shows
that the IV estimates are numerically larger than the
coefficients from identical OLS regressions. This result
is consistent with the idea that representative political
institutions have been conducive to state survival.33
The validity of the 2SLS approach depends on the as-
sumption that, conditional on the controls included in
the analyses, the timing of theNeolithic Revolution has
no effect on democracy other than through its effect on
early state development. To account for the possibility
that geographic, topographic, or climatic factors that
affected the timing of the Neolithic Revolution might
also influence countries’ regime trajectories through
other channels, I included measures of ruggedness,
precipitation and precipitation volatility, soil quality,
33 An additional reason is that IV estimation, as discussed earlier,
corrects for the attenuation bias from measurement error in the
measure of early state development.
481
T
he
A
utocratic
L
egacy
ofE
arly
Statehood
A
ugust2012
TABLE 2. IV Regressions of Democracy on Early State Development
Dependent variable is mean polity2 1991–2007 Alt. dependent variable
Base
Sample
Base
Sample
Excl.
Africa &
Middle
East
Excl. the
Americas
Base
Sample
Base
Sample Only Former Colonies
ACLP
Indicator
Democracy
Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares
Early state −7.18∗∗ −9.54∗∗∗ −14.26∗∗∗ −8.18∗ −13.22∗∗ −10.41∗∗ −6.70∗∗ −10.00∗∗∗ −0.52∗∗ −508∗∗∗
development (3.01) (3.39) (4.13) (4.40) (6.58) (4.25) (3.14) (3.06) (0.26) (173)
Latitude 0.08∗ −0.03 0.09 0.09∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.00 3.60
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (2.75)
Africa −0.56
(2.25)
Asia 5.87∗∗
(2.92)
Latin America 5.00∗∗
(2.27)
Middle East 2.61
(2.90)
Settler mortality −1.47∗∗
(log) (0.61)
p-value for ruggedness [0.99]
p-value for precipitation volatility [0.00]
p-value for soil quality [0.26]
p-value for temperature [0.69]
p-value for humidity [0.77]
Panel B: First Stage Estimates for Early State Development
Timing of Neolithic .08∗∗∗ .08∗∗∗ .10∗∗∗ .07∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .08∗∗∗ .12∗∗∗ .12∗∗∗ .08∗∗∗ .08∗∗∗
Revolution (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
First stage F-statistic 68.06 34.46 18.12 24.78 17.69 4.66 32.86 18.67 34.46 34.46
First stage R2 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.51 0.50 0.44 0.45 0.39 0.39
Countries 111 111 57 86 111 103 88 72 111 111
Notes: Panels A and B report coefficients from the second and first stage of the two-stage least squares estimation. Column (6) controls for (i) terrain ruggedness, measured as percentage
estimated mountainous terrain (log) and the difference in elevation between the highest and lowest point in a country; (ii) climate volatility measured as the standard deviation of yearly
precipitation and the squared standard deviation of yearly precipitation; (iii) soil quality, measured as a set of indicator variables of steppe (low latitude), desert (low latitude), steppe (middle
latitude), desert (middle latitude), dry steppe, and desert dry winter; (iv) temperature, measured as average number of frosty days; and (v) humidity, measured as morning min. and max.,
and afternoon min. and max. humidity.
All model specifications include a constant term (not reported to save space). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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temperature, and humidity as controls in column (6).
As it turns out, they do not affect the results.
Table A3 in the Appendix presents further evidence
in favor of the exclusion restriction. In Panel A, I
included the timing of the Neolithic Revolution as a
regressor alongside early state development in OLS
regressions. If there were an independent effect of the
onset of the agricultural revolution, one would expect
this variable to be significant in these analyses. How-
ever, it is insignificant in almost all models.34
The theories for why societies made the transition
from foraging to farming can be grouped into those
focusing on cultural factors, such as “an innate ability to
civilize nature,” and those focusing on geographic and
climatic factors (e.g., Olsson and Hibbs 2005). Column
(6) in Table 2 shows that the 2SLS approach was robust
to controlling for the geographic and climatic factors.
To purge the estimates of the potentially confound-
ing influence of cultural factors, I did three-stage least
squares (3SLS) where measures of climate volatility
instrument for the timing of the Neolithic Revolution
(panelsB–D inTableA3).Bydoing 3SLS, I use only the
variation in the onset of the Neolithic Revolution that
can be explained by climatic and geographic factors
and thereby remove the potentially confounding influ-
ence of cultural factors. This was inspired by Ashraf
and Michalopoulos (2010), who derive a hump-shaped
relationship between climate volatility and the onset of
the agricultural transition. These authors show that cli-
mate volatility and geographic factors explain as much
as 90% of the cross-country variation in the timing of
the Neolithic Revolution, which already suggests that
cultural factors might not be confounding the identifi-
cation strategy used here. As shown in the Appendix,
our 3SLS estimates are practically indistinguishable
from the 2SLS results.
Overall, the results in Table A3 in the Appendix, as
well as the models that control for geographic and cli-
matic factors that have been shown to affect the timing
of the Neolithic Transition, support the validity of the
instrumental variable approach.
UNPACKING THE CAUSAL CHANNEL
Having documented the negative causal effect of early
statehood on contemporaneous democracy, we ask
“Why?” The overall explanation comes in two parts:
First, the pattern of early statehood outside Europe in-
fluenced the pattern of European colonization and set-
tlement, and second, that in turn influenced contempo-
raneous regime patterns. This section briefly provides
evidence in support of each of these claims. In addition
34 The coefficient on the Neolithic Revolution will be estimated with
bias if the original regressor (early state development) is endogenous.
Therefore, Panel A in Table A3 was reestimated with population
density in 1500 as an instrumental variable for early state devel-
opment. This confirmed the conclusion that—conditional on early
state development—the timing of the Neolithic Revolution exerts no
independent effect on contemporary levels of democracy.
to equations (1) and (2), we can therefore add
Ci = αC + δCSi + βCXCi + Ci. (3)
Di = α4 + δ4Ci + β4X4i + 4i. (4)
Ci represents measures of colonization (coloniza-
tion, colonial duration, and European settlement) as
well as the form of colonial governance (the extent
of indirect rule). Si, again, is the early state develop-
ment of country i. As before, Di is the measure of
democracy in country i. Equation (3) thus describes
the relationship between early state development and
the pattern of European colonization and settlement,
whereas equation (4) describes the relationship be-
tween patterns of European colonization and contem-
poraneous democracy. Following the earlier discussion,
I hypothesize that δC < 0 and δ4 > 0.
Table 3 reports 2SLS estimates of δC in (3), where
the timing of the Neolithic Revolution has again been
used as a source of exogenous variation in early state
development. Only coefficients from the second-stage
regressions are reported. The four panels correspond
to four different measures of European colonization
and settlement. In Panel A, the dependent variable,Ci,
is a dummy taking the value 1 for countries that were
colonies and zero otherwise. In Panel B, Ci is colonial
duration in 100 years; in Panel C, Ci is the fraction
of the population speaking a European language as
their first language; and in Panel D, Ci is the extent of
indirect rule. Columns (1) through (5) present evidence
in support of predictionA.1 (precolonial state develop-
mentwas an impediment toEuropean colonization and
settlement), whereas columns (6)–(8) present evidence
in support of prediction B.1 (conditional on being col-
onized, more developed states were less likely to expe-
rience direct colonial rule and European settlement).
The vector of controls XCi includes the set of fac-
tors in addition to indigenous state development that
might affect the decision, duration, and form of colo-
nization. In column (2), latitude is included as a rough
measure of both the geographic distance and climatic
difference from Europe.35 Column (3) adds a dummy
for landlocked countries and controls also for the av-
erage variation in topographic elevation. Landlocked
countries are difficult to reach and offer less attractive
opportunities for trade. The average variation in eleva-
tion is included because rugged terrain is inhospitable
to farming and to conquest. In column (4), controls for
countries’ endowment of natural resources have been
added. Lastly, in column (5), I add controls for the
quality of soil.
In all cases, the coefficient on early state develop-
ment is negative and significant. The implication is that
countries with earlier state histories were less likely to
be colonized (Panel A), would experience colonization
35 Using great circle distance fromEurope ormaritime distance from
Europe in addition to or instead of latitude yields identical results.
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TABLE 3. IV Regressions of Colonization and Settlement on Early State Development
Full sample Ex-colonies
No
Controls Latitude
Adverse
Geography
Natural
Resources
Soil
Quality Latitude
Settler
Mortality
All
Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A 2SLS Estimates: Dependent Variable is Colonization
Early state −1.37∗∗∗ −1.11∗∗∗ −1.17∗∗∗ −1.15∗∗∗ −1.08∗∗∗
development (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.26) (0.27)
Panel B 2SLS Estimates: Dependent Variable is Colonial Duration
Early state −2.88∗∗∗ −2.51∗∗∗ −2.54∗∗∗ −2.12∗∗∗ −2.00∗∗
development (0.53) (0.65) (0.65) (0.77) (0.82)
Panel C 2SLS: Dependent Variable is Fraction Speaking a European Language
Early state −0.62∗∗∗ −0.82∗∗∗ −0.82∗∗∗ −0.67∗∗∗ −0.68∗∗∗ −0.54∗∗∗ −0.82∗∗∗ −0.80∗∗∗
development (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.21)
Panel D 2SLS: Dependent Variable is Extent of Indirect Rule
Early state 0.66∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗
development (0.23) (0.23) (0.28)
First stage F-statistic 68.01 34.46 17.82 8.91 6.11 32.86 18.67 4.54
First stage R2 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.44 0.45 0.58
Countries 111 111 108 103 103 88 72 70
Notes: The timing of the Neolitihic Revolution is used as IV for early state development in all four panels. Each model adds a
set of controls to the existing set of controls. For example, the model in column (3) controls for both latitude and geography.
The model in column (4) adds controls for natural resources. Adverse geographic characteristics in column (3) are average
topographic elevation differences and an indicator for landlocked countries. Natural resources in column (4) are percent of
world reserves of gold, iron, silver, and zinc. Soil quality in column (5) is measured as a set of indicator variables of steppe
(low latitude), desert (low latitude), steppe (middle latitude), desert (middle latitude), dry steppe, and desert dry winter
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
of a relatively short duration (Panel B), and would
experience less European settlement (Panel C).36 In
columns (6)–(8) the sample is restricted to former
colonies.Whether controlling for latitude (column (6)),
settler mortality (column (7)), or settler mortality plus
the full set of controls from columns (2)–(5) (column
(8)), the analyses in the last three columns support
prediction B.1: Conditional on being colonized, more
developed states are significantly less likely to be col-
onized with settlement and also more likely to experi-
ence indirect colonial rule.
In summary, the large-N analyses confirm the claim
that early state organization served as a bulwark
against European colonization and also shaped the
form of colonial rule chosen by the European colonial
powers.37
36 In Panel C, using the fraction of the population of European de-
scent yields the same result.
37 In all cases, OLS regressions confirm the 2SLS results. A reviewer
suggested that I regress measures of colonization and settlement on
early state development controlling for the timing of the Neolithic
Revolution (linear and quadratic), disease environment, maritime
distance, natural resources, and population density in 1500 to ex-
amine the independent explanatory value of precolonial state de-
velopment. When the dependent variable is colonization (binary),
including precolonial statehood in an OLS regression raised the
R2 from 0.26 to 0.35. When the dependent variable is European
language fraction or percentage of population of European descent,
adding precolonial statehood as a regressor raised the R2 from 0.54
to 0.63 and 0.60 to 0.65, respectively.
We turn now to an assessment of the claim that Eu-
ropean settlement is positively associated with modern
levels of democracy. To that end, OLS estimates of
equation (4) are presented in Table 4. Columns (1)
through (6) show evidence in support of hypothesis
A.2 (colonization, colonial duration, and European
settlement are positively associated with democracy),
whereas columns (7)–(10) show evidence in support
of hypothesis B.2: Conditional on being colonized,
colonies with less settlement and a more indirect form
of colonial rule are more likely to have remained au-
tocratic.
Column (1) reports the discrete difference in the
probability of being a democracy between countries
that were colonized and countries that were not: For-
merEuropean colonies are onaverage 22%more likely
to be democracies than noncolonies outside Europe.
Although the estimate is not significant at conventional
levels, it is close (the p-value is 0.112) and this is largely
a result of the sample.When the sample is not restricted
to the set of countries for which State Antiquity data
are available, the estimated coefficient (of similar size)
is significant with a p-value of 0.067. Column (2) shows
that the duration of European colonization (in 100
years) is strongly associated with democracy. Under
a causal interpretation, the coefficient suggests that an
additional hundred years underEuropean colonial rule
translates into a 2.15 increase in the polity2 measure of
democracy. The coefficient is highly significant.
Column (3) includes a dummy for countries that
were colonized after 1800. This accounts for the
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TABLE 4. Probit and OLS Regressions of Democracy on Colonization and Settlement
ACLP
Indicator Mean polity2 1991–2007
Dependent Variable (1)a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Full Sample Ex-colonies
Colony 0.22
(0.13)
Colonial duration 2.15∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗
(0.39) (0.54) (0.58)
European language 8.58∗∗∗ 6.99∗∗∗ 8.46∗∗∗ 6.89∗∗∗
fraction (1.11) (1.45) (1.23) (1.50)
Extent of indirect rule −5.90∗∗∗ −4.77∗∗∗
(0.97) (1.21)
Post-1800 colonization −2.84∗
dummy (1.51)
British rule 1.40 1.15 1.39 1.87
(1.33) (1.25) (1.39) (1.43)
French rule −0.12 −0.04 0.26 0.32
(1.26) (1.19) (1.36) (1.38)
Spanish-Portuguese 2.78 2.11 2.49∗ 2.68∗
rule (1.69) (1.39) (1.44) (1.52)
Latitude 0.00 0.08∗∗ 0.02 0.08∗ 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
R2 0.37 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.36 0.38 0.33 0.36
Countries 111 111 111 111 111 111 88 88 88 88
Notes: aColumn (1) reports marginal probit estimates and Pseudo-R2. All models include a constant term (not reported to save space). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗
,
∗∗
, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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different colonial experiences of countries that were
colonized during the Great Discoveries in the 16th
century and those that were colonized during the
imperialist scramble in the 19th century. Controlling
for different colonial experiences, the coefficient on
colonial duration is reduced slightly, but remains highly
significant. Column (4) adds indicator variables to ac-
count for the identity of the colonizer: Focusing on
socio-economic outcomes, Landes (1998) argues that
British colonialism had comparatively positive effects,
whereas the consequences of Spanish colonialismwere
largely negative. The coefficient in column (4) docu-
ments that colonial duration remains positively asso-
ciated with modern levels of democracy even when
the different characteristics of the colonial power have
been accounted for.38 Columns (5) and (6) use the
fraction of the population speaking a European lan-
guage as an indicator of the extent of European set-
tlement during colonization. Whether controlling for
latitude or also including indicators for the identity of
the colonists, this measure of settlement is very sig-
nificantly correlated with contemporaneous levels of
democracy.
Columns (7)–(10) zoom in on former colonies to ex-
amine prediction B.2. Columns (7)–(8) show that, also
conditional on being colonized, European settlement
is very strongly associated with contemporary levels of
democracy. This conclusion holds also when control-
ling for the nationality of the colonizer as in column
(8). Columns (9)–(10) show that, conditional on being
colonized, indirect rule is negatively associated with
current levels of democracy, even when controlling for
the identity of the colonizer (cf. column (10)).
In summary, then, Table 4 presents ample evidence
that δ4 > 0: European colonization and settlement are
positively associated with modern levels of democracy.
Controlling for the Causal Channel
The preceding section provided econometric evidence
in support of each of the two steps of the overall ar-
gument separately. In this subsection I show that the
proposed causal channel accounts for the autocratic
legacy of early statehood. If this argument is correct,
then once the pattern of European colonization or set-
tlement is controlled for, the autocratic legacy of early
statehood outside Europe should disappear. We can
examine this claim by testing if the 2SLS estimate of
the coefficient on S in regressions with democracy as
the dependent variable is indistinguishable from zero
once C is controlled for.
Table 5 reports the results using again the timing of
the agricultural transition as an instrument for early
38 The coefficient on Spanish-Portuguese rule is larger than on
British rule because we consider the time period 1991–2007: Most
of the Iberian colonies (in Latin America) democratized during the
1980s, whereas democratic regime change was less frequent among
the former British colonies in Africa. If we look further back in time
(e.g., democratic averages from 1980–2007 or 1960–2007, or indeed
the very long run, 1800-2007 or Gerring’s measure of accumulated
democratic stock since 1900), British rule is more positively associ-
ated with democracy than is Spanish-Portuguese rule.
state development. It uses the same set of exogenous
geographic controls as were used in Table 2, with the
same sample manipulations. Panel A reports second-
stage results from the 2SLS regressions where the frac-
tion of the population speaking as a first language one
of the five colonial power languages is included as a
first- and second-stage regressor. Panel B shows first-
stage results. Panel C shows the coefficients of interest
from identical OLS regressions.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that
the autocratic legacy of early statehood works through
the adverse effect of early statehood on European set-
tlement patterns. Once the pattern of European settle-
ment is controlled for, in all columns we never reject
the hypothesis that early state development has no ef-
fect on democracy. Although the coefficients remain
negative throughout, they are never statistically differ-
ent from zero. Moreover, the size of the coefficient is
generally cut in half compared to Table 2.39
As a further check that the causal channel is the one
hypothesized, I compared the estimated coefficients
from Table 3 and 4 with the reduced-form estimate
from Table 2. As hypothesized by the causal argu-
ment, increasing early state development one stan-
dard deviation (0.32) should reduce democracy by
(0.32) × δC × δ4, where δC is the effect of statehood on
settlement and δ4 is the effect of settlement on democ-
racy. Using themodel specifications from column (2) in
Table 3 and column (5) in Table 4 (i.e., controlling for
latitude only), the estimated effect of early state devel-
opment on democracy that runs through European in-
fluence (settlement) is 0.32 × (−0.82) × 8.58 = −2.25.
This is relatively close to the reduced-form estimate
of 0.32 × (−9.54) = −3.05 from column (2) in Table 2.
This provides additional confirmation that the reduced-
form effect of precolonial state development on con-
temporary levels of democracy does work through the
effect of precolonial state development on the pattern
of European colonization and settlement.
ROBUSTNESS TO
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
There is a large literature on the causes, correlates, and
necessary conditions for democracy. In this section, I
document that the negative effect of precolonial state
development on democracy cannot be attributed to al-
ternative theories.Most of the factors included here are
“bad controls” in the sense that they are also affected
by early state development (e.g., Angrist and Pischke
2009, 64ff.). This creates bias, and one should not in-
terpret the coefficients as causal estimates. Even so, it
is reassuring that the overall finding and the proposed
causal story are robust to comparing countries at, for
example, similar levels of economic development or
societal heterogeneity.
Panel A in Table 6 shows coefficients from mod-
els that successively control for clusters of indicators,
39 Identical qualitative results are found when the fraction of the
population of European descent is a proxy European settlement.
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TABLE 5. OLS and IV Regressions of Democracy on Early State Development
Dependent variable is mean polity2 1991–2007 Alt. dependent variable
Base
Sample
Base
Sample
Excl. Africa
& Middle
East
Excl. the
Americas
Base
Sample
Base
Sample
Only Former
Colonies
ACLP
Indicator
Democracy
Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares
Early state −2.38 −3.57 −16.19 −4.02 −6.33 −6.80 −2.53 −3.68 −0.05 −300
development (3.42) (4.30) (12.56) (5.94) (9.64) (6.56) (3.50) (3.95) (0.31) (192)
Latitude 0.03 −0.03 0.04 0.08 0.15∗ 0.04 0.04 −0.00 1.80
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (2.49)
Africa 2.39
(2.81)
Asia 6.01∗
(3.48)
Latin America 2.87
(2.35)
Middle East 2.46
(3.16)
Settler mortality −0.44
(log) (0.53)
p-value for ruggedness [0.92]
p-value for precipitation volatility [0.00]
p-value for soil quality [0.09]
p-value for temperature [0.87]
p-value for humidity [0.78]
European language 7.72∗∗∗ 7.27∗∗∗ −1.38 9.05∗∗ 7.14∗ 3.91 7.69∗∗∗ 7.68∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 254∗∗∗
fraction (1.40) (1.70) (6.69) (4.48) (4.11) (2.94) (1.33) (1.48) (0.14) (80.3)
Panel B: First-Stage Estimates for Early State Development
Timing of Neolithic .08∗∗∗ .08∗∗∗ .05∗∗ .07∗∗∗ .04∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .10∗∗∗ .07∗∗∗ .07∗∗∗
Revolution (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (0.01) (.01)
First stage F-statistic 39.75 27.66 18.86 24.78 16.44 5.72 25.82 17.47 27.66 27.66
First stage R2 0.42 0.44 0.51 0.37 0.53 0.57 0.48 0.51 0.44 0.44
Countries 111 111 57 86 111 103 88 72 111 111
Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares
Early state −1.96 −2.33 −3.10 −2.34 −3.94∗ −2.52 −3.70∗ −4.17∗ −0.06 −62.09
development (1.69) (1.76) (2.80) (2.05) (2.02) (2.00) (1.95) (2.30) (0.15) (74.64)
European language 7.87∗∗∗ 7.73∗∗∗ 5.57∗∗∗ 10.24∗∗∗ 8.12∗∗∗ 5.87∗∗∗ 7.34∗∗∗ 7.49∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 341∗∗∗
fraction (1.18) (1.24) (1.99) (2.14) (2.09) (1.30) (1.31) (1.18) (0.11) (70.20)
Notes: Panels A and B report coefficients from the second and first stage of the two-stage-least-squares. Panel C reports coefficients from OLS regressions of identical models. Column (6) controls
for (i) terrain ruggedness, measured as percentage of estimated mountainous terrain (log) and the difference in elevation between the highest and lowest point in a country; (ii) climate volatility
measured as the standard deviation of yearly precipitation and the squared standard deviation of yearly precipitation; (iii) soil quality measured as a set of indicator variables of steppe (low latitude),
desert (low latitude), steppe (middle latitude), desert (middle atitude), dry steppe, and desert dry winter; (iv) temperature, measured as average number of frosty days; and (v) humidity, measured as
morning min. and max., and afternoon min. and max. humidity.
All models include a constant term (not reported to save space). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.487
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TABLE 6. OLS Regressions Controlling for Alternative Drivers of Democracy
Modernization Natural All
Hypothesis Fractionalization Religion Resources Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A OLS Estimates: Dependent Variable is Mean polity2 1991–2007
Early state −4.91∗∗ −5.01∗∗ −5.51∗∗∗ −7.01∗∗∗ −3.82∗∗ −7.53∗∗∗ −4.49∗∗
development (1.90) (1.86) (1.69) (1.88) (1.87) (1.90) (1.79)
Log GDP per capita 2000 2.26∗∗∗ 2.38∗∗∗ 2.31∗∗∗
(0.70) (0.80) (0.68)
Urbanization −1.18 −1.22 −6.15∗
(3.73) (3.76) (3.20)
Primary schooling −0.39
(3.04)
Secondary schooling −1.43 0.32
(3.54) (3.84)
Change in log GDP 2.28∗∗∗
per capita (1500–2000) (0.54)
Ethnic fractionalization 1.15 1.77
(3.11) (2.34)
Religious fractionalization −0.40 −4.84∗
(2.62) (2.69)
Linguistic fractionalization −5.25∗∗ −1.11
(2.02) (1.91)
Protestant dummy 3.07∗ 2.06∗
(1.69) (1.72)
Muslim dummy −4.40∗∗∗ −4.64∗∗∗
(1.19) (1.67)
Fuel dummy −4.31∗∗ −5.09∗∗∗
(1.65) (1.69)
Diamond dummy −1.27 0.01
(1.69) (1.60)
Latitude −0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.07∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.07
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
R2 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.18 0.22 0.30 0.60
Countries 93 93 99 105 111 78 68
Panel B Controlling for Fraction of Population Speaking a European Language
Early state −2.04 −2.22 −3.22∗ −2.42 −1.03 −2.68 −1.87
development (2.08) (2.04) (1.90) (2.09) (1.79) (1.98) (2.10)
European-language 6.17∗∗∗ 5.91∗∗∗ 5.02∗∗ 8.69∗∗∗ 6.75∗∗∗ 6.82∗∗∗ 4.86∗∗
fraction (1.91) (1.87) (1.93) (1.69) (1.31) (1.13) (2.16)
Notes: All models include a constant term (not reported to save space). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗
,
∗∗
, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
which en groupe represent alternative theories of the
correlates of democracy. Specifically, I controlled for
indicators of modernization (columns (1)–(3)), frac-
tionalization (4), religion (5), natural resources (6), as
well as the full set of indicators (7). Panel B shows the
coefficient of interest from identicalmodels except that
the measure of European settlement has been added.
Consistent with the claim that the negative effect of
early statehood works through the hypothesized chan-
nel and not the alternative theories, the coefficients on
early state development in Panel A are all significant,
whereas in Panel B they are insignificant.40
40 Note that all models in Table 6 are OLS. The reason that early
state development has not been instrumented is that the clusters of
Seymour Martin Lipset (1959, 80) popularized the
idea that “the factors subsumed under economic devel-
opment carry with it the political correlate of democ-
racy.” This is commonly referred to as modernization
theory. Columns (1) and (2) show that the significantly
negative effect of precolonial statehood on democracy
is robust to comparing countries at identical levels of
development (measured as income per capita, educa-
tion, and urbanization). Acemoglu et al. (2008) showed
that over relatively short time frames (50 or 100 years),
economic growth is not associated with democratic im-
provements. The current income-democracy nexus has
indicators from the alternative theories are clearly endogenous. This
renders the use of 2SLS estimation biased (Wooldridge 2002, 101).
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deeper historical roots and must be traced back five
centuries.41 In column (3), we examine if our story
works through such a long-run association between
economic development and democracy: Is European
settlement associated with democracy because Euro-
peans brought economic development (such that our
story would be one of modernization)? To test this
hypothesis, I controlled for economic growth from
1500 to 2000 (data from Acemoglu et al. 2008). In
Panel A, precolonial state development remains sig-
nificant, and so does European settlement in Panel
B. Together with columns (1) and (2), this provides
preliminary evidence to suggest that our story does
not work through economic development or moderni-
zation.
Column (4) controls for societal heterogeneity. Het-
erogeneity has always been seen as inimical to democ-
racy (e.g., Przeworski 2010, 20), and societal hetero-
geneity is clearly associated with state history: The
composition of subjects within borders depends on the
history and strength of the state, and rulers can actively
shape the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity of
their subjects (through means ranging from homog-
enization through public schooling to deportation or
ethnic cleansing). Column (4) controls for ethnic, re-
ligious, and linguistic fractionalization to remove any
effect of state history that works through population
heterogeneity. Doing so leaves the coefficient highly
significant.42
Protestant and Reformed Christianity have been
claimed to be particularly conducive to democracy
(e.g., Bruce 2006), and Western ideas of individualism
and democracy have been argued to find little reso-
nance in Islamic cultures (e.g., Huntington 1993, 40).
To account for this religious-culturalist perspective, I
added dummies for countries in which the majority of
the population is Protestant or Muslim in column (5).
The relevant coefficient remains significant and nega-
tive. Column (6) controls for natural resources in the
form of either fuel exports or diamonds. The availabil-
ity of natural resource rents that are easily appropriable
raises the pay-off to kleptocracy and thereby increases
the cost to the ruler of democratization. Conditional
on indicators of natural resource richness, the coef-
ficient on early state development remains significant.
In column (7) the full set of factors thatmight confound
the effect of early state development on democracy has
been included as controls, but the coefficient of interest
remains negative and significant.
Panel A in Table 6 documents that, conditional on a
host of alternative theories of the causes and correlates
41 The authors do not interpret this as a long term causal effect of
income on democracy. They suggest, rather, that at critical junctures
in a country’s history, factors such as executive constraints deter-
mine whether the country embarks on a positive development path
(income and democracy) or not.
42 There are identical results no matter what combination of mea-
sures of societal heterogeneity are used (religious, ethnic, and linguis-
tic fractionalization), whether the data are from Fearon and Laitin
(2003) or from Alesina et al. (2003).
of democracy, there is still a negative effect of precolo-
nial statehood on democracy, and Panel B shows that
it works through the pattern of European colonization
and settlement.
CONCLUSION
National regime trajectories are shaped by many fac-
tors. This study has documented the importance of
one such factor that has so far been overlooked in
the social science literature, namely precolonial state
development outside Europe. In his monumental work
on the history of government, Samuel Finer explained
his interest in the history of statehood and state for-
mation by observing that “the way [states] were built
usually has the most important consequences for the
way they came to be governed” (Finer 1997, 4). The
evidence presented in this article supports this ob-
servation: Precolonial state development was a signif-
icant impediment to the development of democracy
outside the European continent, because it limited the
extent of European settlement and, in the countries
that were colonized, favored a more indirect form of
colonial rule. Older states were therefore less likely to
have European institutions transplanted and to have
an influx of settlers carrying the ideals of parliamen-
tarism. Older states, therefore, were more likely to
have persistent forms of traditional, authoritarian rule.
This conclusion was documented for the 111 countries
outside the European continent for which data were
available. The results proved very robust to both OLS
and IV estimation, to different samples, to different
democracy indices, and to a host of exogenous controls.
Controlling for other correlates and potential causes
of democracy did not alter the conclusion. Neither did
stressing the instrumental variable approach or using
3SLS.
A methodological advantage of historical compar-
ative analysis is that it might alleviate some of the
problems of endogeneity and simultaneity that plague
ahistorical approaches (e.g., Capoccia andZiblatt 2010,
4). In much of the developing world today, processes
of state building and regime formation happen simul-
taneously, and at the time of writing, the world society
is engaged in efforts to monopolize violence and build
statehood in Afghanistan and Iraq while also promot-
ing democracy. Historically, the sequence was clearer.
Statehood preceded democracy, and the evidence pre-
sented earlier clearly documents that parliamentary
institutions have not been a corollary of state building
outside Europe. At the most practical level, this un-
derscores that state building and democratization are
distinct processes, and it reminds practitioners that the
latter does not follow automatically from the former.
But this is a minimal insight and there lies a challenge
of practical and theoretical relevance in understanding
more fully how the development of state structures
affects the way states come to be governed. The micro-
dynamics of how a long history of state institutions
translates into authoritarian regime persistence is an
important area for future study.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX TABLE A1. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Early state development (up to 1500) 0.30 0.32 111
Early state development (up to 1750) 0.36 0.30 111
Early state development (combined) 0.34 0.31 111
Mean polity2 (1991–2007) 1.83 5.90 111
Polity2 (2007) 2.72 6.13 109
ACLP indicator (2007) 0.46 0.50 111
Democracy stock −71 253 111
Timing of the Neolithic Revolution (1000 y. before 2000 AD) 4.2 2.40 111
Colonial duration (in 1,000 years) 0.18 0.12 88
Fraction of population speaking a European language as first language 0.20 0.36 111
Fraction of population of European descent 0.12 0.22 110
Extent of indirect rule 0.19 0.54 88
Latitude (absolute) 20.24 13.32 111
Population density in 1500 (log) 0.77 1.63 107
Settler mortality (log) 4.73 1.19 78
Real GDP per capita (2000) (log) 8.18 1.06 109
Long run income change, 1500–2000 (log) 1.60 1.03 99
Secondary schooling 0.34 0.19 94
Primary schooling 0.33 0.17 94
Urbanization 0.50 0.23 111
Ethnic fractionalization 0.52 0.25 110
Linguistic fractionalization 0.45 0.30 106
Religious fractionalization 0.43 0.25 110
Protestant dummy 0.04 0.19 111
Islam dummy 0.30 0.46 111
Fuel dummy 0.17 0.38 78
Diamond dummy 0.14 0.35 111
Note: Number of observations varies across rows due to missing data.
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APPENDIX TABLE A2. Variable Descriptions and Sources
Variable Description Source
Early state
development
Value of the State Antiquity Index up to 1500, 1750, or
combined (1500 for Americas, 1750 for other countries)
at a 5% discount rate.
Bockstette and Putterman
(2007: Version 3)
Democracy level Average value of polity2 for the period 1991–2007.
Alternative periods have been used. See note in text.
Marshall and Jaggers (2007)
ACLP indicator The dichotomous democracy indicator originally
constructed in Przeworski et al. (2000), updated by
Cheibub et al. (2009).
Cheibub et al. (2009)
Democracy stock The sum of countries’ polity2 scores from 1900–2005 with
a 1% annual depreciation rate.
Gerring et al. (2005)
Neolithic Transition The number of years before 2000 AD at which the
transition is estimated to have taken place.
Putterman and Trainor (2006)
European language The fraction of the population speaking as their first
language English, French, German, Spanish, or
Portuguese.
Hall and Jones (1999)
Population of Eur.
descent
Descendants from Belgium, England, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, or Spain.
Own calculation based on
Putterman and Weil (2008)
Indirect rule The number of colonially recognized court cased divided
by the total number of court cases (in 1955).
Lange (2004)
Population density
in 1500
Population density in 1500 (natural log). Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2002)
Latitude Absolute value of the latitude of the country, where 0 is
equator.
Rodrik, Subramanian, and
Trebbi (2004)
Landlocked Dummy equals 1 if country does not adjoin the sea. Rodrik, Subramanian, and
Trebbi (2004)
Log GDP per capita
2000
GDP per capita (natural log). World Development Indicators
CD-ROM (2007)
Long run income
change
Change in income per capita 1500–2000. Acemoglu et al. (2008)
Schooling Percentage of primary or secondary schooling attained in
the population.
Barro and Lee (2010)
Fractionalization Ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization. Fearon and Laitin (2003);
Alesina et al. (2003)
Urbanization Fraction of population living in urban areas in 2006. World Development CD-ROM
(2007)
Religious variables Dummies for Protestant and Muslim majority countries. Alesina et al. (2003); CIA
World Factbook
Natural resources Percent of world gold reserves, percent of world iron
reserves, percent of world silver reserves, percent of
world zinc reserves.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001)
Colonial origin Nationality of colonizer. Olsson (2009)
Fuel dummy Indicator variable taking the value 1 if fuel exports account
for one-third or more of export revenue.
Fearon and Laitin (2003)
Diamond dummy Indicator variable taking the value 1 for countries with
primary diamond deposits and production.
Gilmore, Gleditsch, Lujala,
and Rod (2005)
Colonial duration Number of years under European colonial rule (in 100
years).
Olsson (2009)
Terrain ruggedness Mean variation in topographic elevation by country and
percentage of mountainous terrain.
Fearon and Laitin (2003)
Soil quality Indicator variables of low latitude steppe, low latitude
desert, middle latitude steppe, middle latitude desert,
dry steppe, and desert dry winter.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001)
Temperature Average yearly temperature and average number of frosty
days.
Rodrik, Subramanian, and
Trebbi (2004)
Humidity Indicator variables of morning and afternoon maximum
and mimimum humidity.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001)
Precipitation Mean annual precipitation, standard deviation of
precipitation, and standard precipitation squared.
Nordhaus et al. (2010),
G-Econ Database
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APPENDIX TABLE A3. On the Validity of the Instrument
Alt. Dependent
Dependent Variable is Mean polity2 1991–2007 Variables
Base
Sample
Base
Sample
Africa&
Middle
East
Dummies
Americas
Dummies
Incl. Only
Former
Colonies
Base
Sample
Geographic
Controls
ACLP-
Indicator
Democracy
Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: OLS with Timing of Neolithic Revolution Included as Regressor
Early state −4.40∗∗ −4.73∗∗ −5.09∗∗ −2.68 −7.71∗∗∗ −5.09∗∗ −5.21∗∗ −0.33∗ −110
development (2.16) (2.22) (2.13) (2.10) (2.53) (2.13) (2.55) (0.18) (90.24)
Timing of Neolithic −0.23 −0.38 −0.57 −0.25 0.12 −0.41 −0.45 −0.02 −31.69∗
Revolution (0.32) (0.35) (0.38) (0.35) (0.45) (0.38) (0.38) (0.03) (16.3)
Countries 111 111 111 111 88 111 106 111 111
Panel B: Three-Stage Least Squares
Early state −6.33∗∗∗ −8.12∗∗∗ 12.30∗∗∗ −3.20 −7.54∗∗∗ −11.99∗∗∗ −13.18∗∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗ −425∗∗∗
development (2.10) (2.28) (2.73) (2.64) (2.31) (3.33) (2.41) (0.20) (99.12)
Latitude 0.08∗ −0.03 0.05 0.13∗∗∗ 0.06 0.13∗∗∗ 0.00 3.51∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (1.87)
Panel C: Second Stage for Early State Development
Timing of Neolithic .12∗∗∗ .12∗∗∗ .13∗∗∗ .11∗∗∗ .18∗∗∗ .12∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ .12∗∗∗ .12∗∗∗
Revolution (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Panel D: First Stage for Timing of Neolithic Revolution
p-value for climate volatility [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000]
First Stage R2 0.69 0.69 0.78 0.68 0.69 0.60 0.60 0.69 0.69
Countries 108 108 55 84 85 108 81 108 108
Notes: Panel A reports the coefficients from OLS regressions of democracy on Early state development and the timing of the Neolithic Revolution. Panel B reports the coefficient
of early state development in 3SLS-models, where the timing of the Neolithic Revolution instruments for early state development (Panel C), and climate volatility instruments for
the timing of the Neolithic Revolution (Panel D). Climate volatility is measured by the standard deviation of precipitation, the square of the standard deviation of precipitation,
and mean precipitation. Included also are continent dummies and. latitude. All columns except column (1) control for latitude. Column (6) includes continent dummies (Africa,
Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East). Column (7) includes dummies for soil quality: steppe (low latitude), desert (low latitude), steppe (middle latitude), desert (middle
latitude), dry steppe, and desert dry winter; and measures of ruggednes: percentage of mountainous terrain and the difference in elevation between the highest and the lowest
point in a country. All model specifications include a constant term (not reported to save space).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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